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10.1  Introduction 
Most studies of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) have been 
conducted for advanced countries such as the United States, Sweden, and 
Japan. The reason is simple. These countries have invested much abroad 
and thus issues related to their OFDI have merited a wide range of stud- 
ies. By  contrast, research on the OFDI of developing countries is almost 
nonexistent because such nations have been mostly recipients rather than 
exporters of  direct investment. Since the mid-l980s, however, some East 
Asian  developing countries have  been  experiencing  a  surge in  OFDI, 
which makes it worthwhile to launch a study of the OFDI of developing 
countries. Excluding Singapore, the Asian newly industrialized countries 
(NICs) have already transformed themselves into net exporters of direct 
investment despite starting as net importers. Korea was a net importer of 
direct investment through the 1980s, but since 1990, it has recorded more 
OFDI than inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) on a flow basis. Over 
that time span, its OFDI has increased at a rapid pace, making OFDI a 
topic of discussion in Korea. 
The two main questions to be tackled in this paper are the following: 
What role did Korean OFDI play in its economic performance? What are 
the characteristics of Korean OFDI? In contrast to developed countries, 
sufficient data are lacking for Korea, making a rigorous study difficult. 
Given this shortcoming, to be expatiated on later, this paper tries to ap- 
proach the questions stated above in a persuasive manner. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 10.2 outlines 
Seungjin Kim is a research fellow of Korea Development Institute. 
295 296  Seungjin Kim 
the trends, structures, and motives of Korean OFDI. Section 10.3 exam- 
ines evidence of the effects that Korean OFDI has on home investment 
and exports. Section 10.4 points out key  characteristics supporting the 
evidence and compares the situation with those in  developed countries 
such as Sweden and the United States. Section 10.5 provides a summary 
and conclusion. 
10.2  Korean Outward Foreign Direct Investment: 
Trends, Structures, and Motives 
Korea started directly investing abroad in 1968, but its annual outflow 
was very insignificant (less than $200 million) until the mid-1  980s because 
of governmental controls on foreign exchange outflows and incapability 
on the part of firms. Korean OFDI began to expand in  1986 when  the 
relevant restrictions were  lifted. Over the next decade, OFDI increased 
exponentially, amounting to $4.2 billion of  investment outflow in  1996 
This surge was due to the rising cost of production, the need for better 
market access, and the enhanced capabilities of firms, as well as the relax- 
ation of regulatory measures. The share of Korean OFDI stock in the total 
OFDI stock of developing countries increased from 2.0 percent in  1985, 
to 3.1 percent in 1990, and then to 4.9 percent in 1996. 
Despite the increase, however, Korea’s ratio of OFDI stock to GDP in 
1995 was around 2.2 percent, far below those of  other NICs, as well  as 
those of developed countries, including Sweden, the United States, and 
Japan (table 10.1). 
Why did Korea invest less abroad than developed countries and other 
NICs in terms of the size of its economy? First, Korean firms have weak 
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Table 10.1  Outward FDI Stock as a Percentage of GDP, 1990-95 
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veloped country firms with superior knowledge or technology to invest 
more abroad to exploit such advantages. The ownership advantages of 
Korean multinationals have long been in technologies forgotten by devel- 
oped countries but not yet adopted by  latecomers. However, some large 
conglomerates in the electronics and automobile sectors have recently de- 
veloped knowledge-intensive technologies, thus strengthening their tech- 
nological bases. Second, Korean OFDI, most of which is undertaken by 
large conglomerates with much use of capital-intensive technologies, has 
been less sensitive to rising wages than that of other NICs whose multina- 
tional firms have employed labor-intensive technologies. Although a num- 
ber of small and medium-size enterprises in Korea are in labor-intensive 
industries that face pressures from rising wages and have responded like 
their counterparts in the other NICs, they account for only a small propor- 
tion of the country’s total OFDI. OFDI by Korean conglomerates is in- 
tended more to establish market share in host countries (i.e., in Southeast 
Asia and developed countries), or to gain access to new technologies and 
skills, and less to acquire cheaper labor. Third, the small amount of IFDI 
has placed little pressure on Korean firms to go multinational. The gov- 
ernment has protected domestic markets by restricting IFDI and imports, 
providing an uncompetitive market environment in which domestic firms 
can make sufficient profits without going multinational. 
The motives of foreign production have changed over time. Korean mul- 
tinationals have typically established foreign affiliates to avoid trade bar- 
riers and reduce transportation costs at an early stage of foreign produc- 
tion. After the mid-I980s, they started setting up foreign affiliates to exploit 
wage differences. Simultaneously, they also moved production to foreign 
sites to get closer to their customers, which became necessary in order to 
adapt to local tastes or production standards. Moreover, some multina- 298  Seungjin Kim 
tionals have acquired developed country firms to obtain advanced tech- 
nologies that otherwise would take too much time and money to develop. 
These motives are sometimes pursued simultaneously and are thus hard 
to separate in explaining the foreign production behavior of some multina- 
tionals. In particular, a few conglomerates have started to adopt regional 
strategies seeking lower costs and better market access, blurring the dis- 
tinction between the two motives. 
Korean OFDI has been most concentrated in the manufacturing sector, 
followed by wholesale trade. The sectoral distribution of the outward in- 
vestment of Korean manufacturing firms in 1990 and 1996 is presented in 
table 10.2. 
Mechanical equipment was the most important sector in both years, 
and its percentage increased significantly during the period. Metals was 
the second largest sector in 1990, but its share dropped by a lot during the 
period. The share of textiles and clothing fell slightly but occupied the 
second position in 1996. 
Table  10.3 presents  data on the geographical distribution of Korean 
OFDI in 1990 and 1996. OFDI to Asia jumped rapidly during that period, 
and as a result, Asia has become the most important OFDI region. In 
particular, China has become the prime destination for Korean manufac- 
turing OFDI and the second most popular OFDI region in all industries. 
The percentage of OFDI to Europe also increased during the period ex- 
amined. In particular, Eastern Europe has become a strategic investment 
region, reflecting a recent trend of investing in emerging markets. North 
America’s attractiveness to Korean OFDI has declined, leaving it the sec- 
ond most important region. Among countries, the U.S. share of Korean 
manufacturing OFDI has dropped to the second, but the United States 
remains the prime target for total OFDI. 
Table 10.2  Sectoral Distribution of OFDI by Korean Manufacturing Firms, 
19%96  (percent) 
Sector  1990  1996 
Food and beverages 
Textiles and clothing 
Shoes and leather 
Wood and furniture 
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Table 10.3  Geographical Distribution of Korean OFDI, 1990-96 (percent) 
Region 
All Industries  Manufacturing 
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10.3  Effects of Korean Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
on Home Country Performance 
In this section, we examine the evidence of the effects of Korean OFDI 
on home investment and exports, reflecting its financial-side effects and 
real-side effects. 
10.3.1  Domestic Investment 
OFDI may detract from a home country’s capital stock. Whether OFDI 
takes place at the expense of domestic investment depends on how that 
investment is financed. However, indirect effects, including investment fi- 
nanced through repatriation of profits or brought about by increased for- 
eign demand for exports, also have to be taken into account. The evidence 
regarding the effects of OFDI on domestic investment is mixed. Stevens 
and  Lipsey  (1  992) demonstrated a  strong positive correlation  between 
fixed investment at home and abroad by U.S. multinationals. However, the 
positive relation between domestic and foreign investment likely results 
from the positive relation between both types of investment and a parent 
firm’s internally  generated  funds. This evidence, at least,  suggests that 












79  81  83  85  87  89  91  93  95 
year 
--+-  OFDIlGDP 
Fig. 10.2  Foreign investment and domestic investment, 1978-95 
Sources: Bank of Korea, National Accounts (Seoul, various years); Bank of Korea (1997). 
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In contrast, Feldstein (1 995) showed that outward investment and domes- 
tic investment are at least partial substitutes. Svensson (1993) also showed 
that in the 1980s, OFDI by  Swedish multinationals had a negative effect 
on the size of Sweden's capital stock. 
Unfortunately, in Korea, no firm-level data are available for a rigorous 
analysis of the relation between outward and domestic investment by Ko- 
rean firms. Looking at the trends of  outward and domestic investment 
over 1978-95  in figure 10.2, we  can see that outward and domestic invest- 
ment did not go in opposite directions. Domestic investment increased by 
a large margin over the 1986-90  period, during which outward investment 
increased steadily due to the relaxation of  capital outflow restrictions. 
Both types of  investment also show similar growth patterns after  1990. 
This, of  course, does not tell much about the relation between outward 
and  domestic investment. Nevertheless,  outward  investment  does  not 
seem to have had a large negative impact on domestic investment for the 
following reasons. First, an increasing part of outward investment by  Ko- 
rean firms tends to be financed from external resources. In 1995, the share 
of  home sources in total financing of  OFDI amounted to less than 40 
percent, and in particular, the share was less than 20 percent for the large 
conglomerates that account for most Korean OFDI.' In the case of U.S. 
multinationals, about 20 percent of the value of foreign-affiliate assets is fi- 
nanced through cross-border capital outflows from the United States (Feld- 
stein 1995). Although Korea had a larger share of cross-border financing 






1. In 1995, the five largest conglomerates accounted for approximately 60 percent of Ko- 
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foreign sources.* Second, the size of  outward investment has been very 
small relative to that of domestic investment, and export creation effects 
of outward investment also exist. 
10.3.2  Exports 
Foreign production can replace exports of a single product. But it usu- 
ally generates demand for other products, such as capital goods or inter- 
mediate goods and services. These products may  be provided by  other 
parts of the parent company, its suppliers, or independent firms at home. 
So foreign production can be either export replacing or export supporting. 
Most  analytical evidence relates to developed  countries, including the 
United States and  Sweden. The majority of  studies showed that OFDI 
had an overall positive effect on home exports, suggesting that the export- 
creating effect of  OFDI outweighed the export-replacing effect (Lipsey 
and Weiss  198 1; Swedenborg 1979; Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Kulchycky 
1988). In contrast to the numerous studies for developed countries, very 
few  studies have addressed the case of developing countries. Questions 
about the effects of  OFDI on home exports and employment in  Korea 
have received much attention since OFDI by  Korean firms surged in the 
early 1990s. Nevertheless, there is a dearth of detailed studies due to lack 
of data.3 While data on the amount of foreign investment exist, no infor- 
mation is available on foreign affiliate activities, such as production, ex- 
ports, and sales. No firm-level data are available either. Such deficiencies 
have made it difficult to undertake rigorous studies of the home country 
effects of OFDI by  Korean firms. However, given the available data, we 
will try to estimate the empirical relation between OFDI and exports. In- 
vestigating the graphical relation between OFDI and exports will precede 
the regressional analysis of their relation. 
Figure 10.3 tells us how OFDI and exports in particular industries as 
ratios to the production size of  the industry, have evolved between 1990 
and 1994. There appears to be no substitution between OFDI and exports, 
represented as ratios to production size, of the total manufacturing indus- 
try. However, this graph shows only a simple trend of two variables, not 
2. As the portion  of  large-scale outward  investments of some conglomerates financed 
abroad increased, the Korean government implemented controls on foreign financing in late 
1995. It introduced self-financing  obligations and controls on foreign financing through pay- 
ment guarantees by parent firms out of concern that firms might undertake excessive OFDI 
and so weaken the home base of production or that the failure of a foreign business might 
lead to the failure of the parent providing a payment guarantee. Ironically, the government 
had no superior knowledge with which to judge whether a firm had made an overinvestment, 
and moreover, restrictions on foreign financing could have substituted for domestic invest- 
ment resources. Self-financing obligations were lifted in 1997, but some controls on foreign 
financing through payment guarantees by parents remain. 
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Fig. 10.3  Exports and OFDI of major industries, 1990, 1992, and 1994 
Sources: Bank of Korea (1997) and information from Korean Bureau of Tariffs and Bureau 
of Statistics. 
Note: 2, Textiles and clothing; 3, shoes and leather; 6, petrochemicals; 8, metals; 9, mechani- 
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suggesting that OFDI has not decreased home exports. Major industries 
show varying trends. During 1990-92,  in textiles and clothing and shoes 
and leather, OFDI increased while exports decreased. In contrast, both 
OFDI and exports increased in petrochemicals, metals, and mechanical 
equipment during the same period. We can observe a similar sectoral pat- 
tern during 1992-94,  except that OFDI and exports for metals both de- 
creased. We need to be cautious in interpreting sectoral trends. In the case 
of textiles and clothing and shoes and leather, we  cannot say that OFDI 
decreased exports. Rather, it seems more probable that OFDI increased 
but exports decreased as these sectors lost their comparative advantages. 
OFDI may have increased exports,  instead. In the case of mechanical 
equipment, we cannot say that OFDI increased exports. Both OFDI and 
exports may have increased as the sector gained competitive advantages. 
Consequently, movements of OFDI and exports tend to be influenced by 
common factors. The cross-sectional correlation between OFDI and ex- 
ports, represented as ratios to production size, turned out to be positive 
(.78) in 1994. 
Figure 10.4 shows how OFDI and exports to particular countries, repre- 
sented as ratios to the GDP of the destination were correlated in  1994. 
The correlation between OFDI and exports turned out to be positive (.38), 
meaning that Korea exported more to countries in which it invested more. 
This does not imply that OFDI had a positive effect on exports. Variables 
affecting OFDI and exports in the same direction may have produced the 
positive correlation. 
An econometric study will help us to understand the systematic relation Effects of Outward FDI on Home Country Performance in Korea  303 
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Fig. 10.4  Exports and OFDI to major countries, 1994 
Sources: Bank of  Korea (1997); World Bank, World Development Report (Washington, D.C., 
1997); information from Korean Bureau of Tariffs. 
Note: JP, Japan; AU, Australia; GR, Germany; MX, Mexico; UK, United Kingdom; US, 
United States; SG, Singapore; HK, Hong Kong; HG, Hungary; IL, Ireland; CA, Canada; 
PR, Portugal; TH, Thailand; RM, Romania; GT, Guatemala; CN, China; PH, Philippines; 
ML, Malaysia; and ID, Indonesia. 
between OFDI and exports. As mentioned earlier, lack of data prevents 
us from doing more in-depth analysis. A systematic relation will be sought 
using the amount of outward investment and exports. 
The export equation to be estimated takes GDP of a destination, GDP 
per capita of a destination, and a dummy representing EC membership as 
independent  variable^.^ GDP and GDP per capita are the country charac- 
teristic variables that seem to significantly affect OFDI as well as exports. 
The EC dummy reflects Korean firms’ tariff-jumping OFDI in EC coun- 
tries. Besides these variables, distance, relative wages, tariffs and nontariff 
barriers could affect exports, but they will not be included in the estima- 
tion because relevant data are lacking. So the export equation takes the 
following form:s 
EXo =  f(GDPl,GDPCl,OFDI,,,  EC,), 
4. ASEAN could be a dummy variable but it is inferior to an EC dummy for the purpose 
of my  study. I included the EC dummy to reflect tanff-jumping OFDI by  Korean firms and 
to keep the effects of a trading bloc from being transferred to the effects of OFDI. ASEAN, 
in 1992, agreed to form a free trade area and has been taking steps to complete the AFTA 
(ASEAN Free Trade Area). So it seems inappropriate to regard ASEAN as a complete trad- 
ing bloc in  1994, the year for which values were taken for all variables in the estimation. 
Furthermore, Korean OFDI to the ASEAN region was not in general motivated by  tariff 
jumping but by wage differences, while its OFDI to the EC region was largely motivated by 
tariff jumping. 
5. This specification helps us to examine how exports to country j  are affected by  OFDI 
to country j.  So the results of the regressions have nothing to do with the story of chaebols 
(large conglomerates) expanding exports and OFDI through favorable loans or cash flows. 304  Seungiin Kim 
where EX,  is  exports of  industry  i to countryj; GDP, and GDPC, are, 
respectively, GDP and GDP per capita of countryj; OFDIll is outward 
foreign direct investment of industry i to countryj; and EC, is the dummy 
variable representing EC membership.'j  The variables EX,,  OFDI,, GDP,, 
and GDPC, take 1994 values for fifty-seven destinations and nine indus- 
tries. The coefficient of GDP is expected to be positive because GDP re- 
flects market size. Exports will increase as market size increases. The co- 
efficient of GDPC may be positive or negative, depending on the income 
elasticity of demand. The coefficient of EC is expected to be negative be- 
cause the European Community, as a trading bloc, discourages exports to 
the region. Finally, the coefficient of OFDI may be positive or negative, 
which is to be confirmed in this econometric study. 
The results of the regressions are as follows (see the appendix). OFDI 
turns out to have a positive relation with exports in the regression using 
all destinations or all destinations and industries. The coefficients of GDP 
and EC are, respectively, positive and negative as expected. The positive 
effect of OFDI on exports appears to be far greater for developing coun- 
tries than for developed countries. The coefficient of OFDI is  strongly 
positive in the regression using a group of developing countries as destina- 
tions, while it is insignificantly positive in the case of developed countries. 
The impact of OFDI is prominent in such industries as shoes and leather, 
textiles and clothing, petrochemicals, and mechanical equipment. The 
effects are, however, insignificantly negative in metals and food. If we take 
the textiles and clothing and shoes and leather industries and call them 
labor intensive, we  can see that the impact of OFDI on exports is greater 
for labor-intensive industries than  for industries overall. The effect  of 
OFDT in labor-intensive industries toward developing countries is strongly 
positive, but the effect of OFDI in labor-intensive  industries toward devel- 
oped countries is insignificantly positive. In contrast to the conventional 
wisdom that OFDI in labor-intensive  industries toward developing coun- 
tries reflects an exodus of such industries and the subsequent weakening 
of their export bases, the effect of OFDI on exports turned out to be pos- 
itive. This implies that OFDI created new exports of  intermediate goods 
in  the same industries, an effect that seems to exceed its replacement 
effect. 
In spite of the results, all regressions described above have limitations 
because of  omitted variables that could affect both OFDI and exports. 
Although we included GDP and GDP per capita to stop their effects from 
being transferred to the effect of OFDI, we  cannot exclude the possibility 
that omitted variables may have affected exports in the name of OFDI. In 
order to reduce such a possibility, we  regress export variation between 
6.  The European Community includes France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the United King- 
dom, Portugal, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Spain. Effects of Outward FDI on Home Country Performance in Korea  305 
1992 and 1994 on OFDI variation, GDP variation, and exports in 1992. 
That is, the new export equation we  estimate is 
(2)  AEX,  =  f(  AGDP,, EX92, AOFD19), 
where AEX,,  AOFDI,,  and AGDP, represent the variations of  exports, 
OFDI, and GDP between 1992 and 1994. EX92 is the 1992 (initial) value 
of exports and plays the role of absorbing the effects of omitted variables. 
The results of  the new  regression, in table  10.4, show similarities to 
those of the former regressions. Consequently, we found no evidence that 
Korean OFDI substituted for exports. If the coefficients for the variables 
other than OFDI were eccentric or even if  they had negligible influence 
where we  expected them to be important, some doubt would be cast on 
the coefficients for OFDI, because it would be likely that some effects of 
country characteristics entering the trade equation were being absorbed 
by  the OFDI variable. Coefficients that looked reasonable would add to 
our confidence in the measures of the effect of OFDI. However, the effect 
of OFDI on exports may have to be compared to what would have hap- 
pened to exports without OFDI. The econometric study may infer what 
would have happened to exports without OFDI from exports to countries 
where no OFDI took place. But the econometric study gives limited infor- 
mation on the counterfactual situation without OFDI due to omitted vari- 
ables. The positive coefficients of OFDI may result from the omission of 
variables that could have increased both OFDI and exports. Differencing 
equations between two points in time can reduce the influence of omitted 
variables, but it is not likely to exclude their effect completely. 
However, the econometric study combined with figure 10.4 hints that 
the effect of OFDI is likely to be positive. The regression for all destina- 
tions tells us that OFDI to countryj  had a positive effect on exports to 
country j.  If omitted variables that could have increased both OFDI and 
exports produced the positive coefficient, the omitted variables are prob- 
ably policy variables of host countries representing their openness to trade 
and investment. In figure 10.4, the ratio of OFDI and exports to GDP 
Table 10.4  Coefficients of OFDI and OFDI Variation 
OFDI  AOFDI 
All countries  0.32 (5.58)  0.13  (2.21) 
All countries and industries=  0.24  (4.60)  0.25  (3.73) 
Developing countriesa  0.38  (5.51)  0.26  (3.08) 
Labor-intensive industriesb  0.53  (4.69)  0.35  (2.56) 
Developed countries"  0.04 (0.58)  -0.02  (0.21) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are f-values. 
aIndustry dummies were used. 
bTextiles  and clothing; shoes and leather. 306  Seungjin Kim 
tends to be higher in developing countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines,  and  China,  than in  developed  countries,  such  as the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Since it is hard to say 
that these developing countries are ahead of the developed countries in 
their openness to trade and investment, the open policy of a host country 
is unlikely to have had a large impact. 
10.4  Characteristics of Korean Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
That Support Home Country Effects 
In this section, we  examine what characteristics of Korean OFDI con- 
tributed to its home country effects. We propose four characteristics: the 
low ratio of OFDI to GDP, the high share of developing countries, the 
increasing importance of overseas financing, and simple integration strat- 
egies. 
10.4.1  Low Ratio of Outward Foreign Direct Investment to GDP 
There has been much concern about the “hollowing out” of manufac- 
turing industries as OFDI flows have surpassed IFDI flows since 1990. 
Korean OFDI has grown faster than world OFDI overall and than OFDI 
from developed countries. The  annual  average  growth rate  of  Korean 
OFDI for 1991-96  was 27.4 percent; the corresponding figures were 12.5 
percent for the world overall and 10.2 percent for the developed countries. 
However, Korean OFDI has not grown faster than OFDI from other de- 
veloping countries. The annual growth for such countries during the same 
period was 52.4 percent. Moreover, OFDI from Korean firms has been 
small in terms of the size of the country’s economy. The ratio of OFDI 
stock to GDP in Korea is lower than in the other NICs, not to mention 
developed countries. Therefore, the economic effects of OFDI do not seem 
to be greater in Korea than in other nations. 
10.4.2  High Share of Developing Countries 
The developing country share of Korean manufacturing OFDI was 7 1.5 
percent in 1996, much higher than the developing country share of manu- 
facturing OFDI from developed countries. In textiles and clothing and 
shoes and leather, the developing country shares were over 90 percent. In 
mechanical equipment and petrochemicals, the developing country shares 
were 66.6 percent and 83.0 percent, respectively. Why is a big part of Ko- 
rean OFDI directed  toward  developing countries? Most  Korean  multi- 
national firms have smaller bases of ownership advantage, and their ad- 
vantages derive from adaptation and experience rather than proprietary 
technology and brand names. Korean multinationals lacking proprietary 
assets exploit the weak  ownership advantages  in developing countries. 
Most OFDI toward developed countries is made by a few conglomerates Effects of Outward FDI on Home Country Performance in Korea  307 
with proprietary assets or brand names. What do high developing country 
shares imply about the role of OFDI in home country performance? First, 
OFDI has contributed to an increase in exports from Korea. More spe- 
cifically, OFDI to developing countries tends to induce more exports of 
intermediate goods from the home country because local firms are unable 
to supply these goods. Moreover, the degree to which OFDI substitutes 
for exports may be lower because the low-cost advantages of developing 
countries would give a narrower chance to home exports even without 
OFDI to the region. Second, OFDI has been upgrading the composition 
the workforce between “blue collar” and “white collar” jobs-between 
the unskilled and the skilled. Exports of blue-collar or unskilled jobs are 
inevitable as Korea loses its comparative advantages in activities that make 
intensive use of blue-collar or unskilled labor, while demand for skilled 
labor or white-collar workers to manage foreign subsidiaries tends to in- 
crease. 
10.4.3 
We see, in table 10.5, that overseas financing as a share of total invest- 
ment financing was approximately 55 percent in 1994, which is low com- 
pared  to the U.S. and Japanese figures. This seems to be related to the 
Increasing Importance of Overseas Financing 
Table 10.5  OFDI Financing by  U.S. and Japanese Transnational Corporations, 
1994 and 1992 (million US. dollars) 





Other home sources 
Overseas sources 
Host country sources 












































Sources:  United  Nations (1997) and information from  Korean Ministry  of  Finance and 
Economy. 
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high share going to developing countries as well as restrictions on foreign 
financing. The underdevelopment of capital markets in developing coun- 
tries makes it difficult to finance operations locally. Recently, Korean mul- 
tinationals, especially large conglomerates, have increased their use of for- 
eign funds, which contributed to an increase in overseas investment at less 
expense to domestic investment. 
10.4.4  Simple Integration Strategies 
Most Korean multinational firms are currently at the stage of  simply 
connecting parent firms and foreign subsidiaries and having parent firms 
export a considerable amount of intermediate goods to their foreign sub- 
sidiaries. Some Korean conglomerates, however, have started to adopt ad- 
vanced, complex strategies through which they efficiently allocate a variety 
of value-added activities within and across regions to increase their market 
shares. Foreign subsidiaries are becoming more localized to increase local 
sourcing and, in  addition,  exporting more  to  third  countries. Export- 
creating effects through exports from parents to foreign subsidiaries are 
expected to decrease. Moreover, parents’ exports to third countries are 
also expected to be replaced by exports from foreign subsidiaries. 
10.5  Summary and Conclusion 
We  could not find any evidence that OFDI by  Korean multinational 
firms had a detrimental effect on home country performance. Even though 
Korean multinational firms depend less on foreign funds than do devel- 
oped country firms, overseas investment does not seem to have signifi- 
cantly crowded out domestic investment because the amount of  OFDI 
was small relative to domestic investment and the demand for domestic 
investment increased as a result  of  increased exports. Moreover, these 
firms are financing an increasingly large part of overseas investment from 
abroad. The OFDI of Korean multinational firms was also discovered to 
have a positive effect on exports. The high share in OFDI of developing 
countries and close associations between parents and foreign subsidiaries 
seem to have contributed  to the positive effect on exports through  in- 
creased exports from parents to foreign subsidiaries. 
As pointed out above, the lack of evidence that OFDI has harmful ef- 
fects on home country performance can be attributed to the fact that Ko- 
rean OFDI has been in its infant stage: OFDI is not big enough to signifi- 
cantly affect the domestic economy, and the  strategies associated with 
OFDI are not complex enough to substitute for exports on the net bal- 
ance. The question arising from this context is naturally, Can this situation 
continue to hold as Korean  OFDI increases and  its strategies become 
more complex? The answer depends on how large a portion of OFDI will 
be involved in complex strategies in  which foreign subsidiaries become Effects of Outward FDI on Home Country Performance in Korea  309 
more independent and play  stronger roles as export bases within their 
multinational firms. A few business conglomerates have already initiated 
complex strategies on a regional scale in which both local sourcing and 
foreign subsidiaries’ exports have increased. It is not clear at this stage 
how far and how  fast the strategies will go and how many firms will be 
able to pursue these strategies. 
Appendix 
Table 10A.l  OLS Estimation of Export Equation I 
Coefficients 
- 
Intercept  GDP  GDPC  EC  FDI  R2  N 
All countries  -1.65  0.71  0.09  -0.56  0.32  0.82  57 
All countries and  -  1.62  0.77  -0.01  -0.58  0.24  0.71  167 
(-2.35)  (7.67)  (0.82)  (-3.41)  (5.58) 
industries  (-2.30)  (9.83)  (-0.14)  (-3.74)  (4.60) 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
Table 10A.2  OLS Estimation of Export Quation I1 
Coefficients 
- 
Intercept  GDP  GDPC  EC  FDI  R2  N 
Developed countries  -4.57  0.88  0.66  -0.34  0.04  0.89  50 
(-2.14)  (6.51)  (1.02)  (-2.93)  (0.58) 
Developing countries  -3.57  0.81  0.21  0.38  0.71  117 
(-3.30)  (7.53)  (1.82)  (5.51) 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are t-values. Table 10A.3  OLS Estimation of Export Equation 111 
Coefficients 
- 





















































































































































Note:  Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
"Textiles and clothing; shoes and leather. 
bPetrochemicals; metals; mechanical equipment. 




























GDPC  EC 
1.52  -0.11 
(0.66)  (-0.29) 
0.52 
(2.32) 
2.67  -0.12 
(1.99)  (0.41) 
0.11 
(0.68) 
FDI  R2  N 
0.15  0.81  11 
0.70  0.58  36 
0.29  0.43  24 
(1.69) 




Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. Table lOA.5  OLS Estimation of Export Variation Equation I 
Coefficients 
~ 
Intercept  AGDP  EX92  AFDI  R2  N 
All countries  0.52  1.08  -0.06  0.13  0.25  50 
All countries and  0.22  1.65  -0.03  0.25  0.20  130 
(2.37)  (3.64)  (-2.26)  (2.21) 
industries  (0.80)  (3.70)  (-0.08)  (3.73) 
Nore: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
Table 10A.6  OLS Estimation of Export Variation Equation 11 
Coefficients 
~  ~ 
Intercept  AGDP  EX92  AFDI  R'  N 
Developed countries  -0.43  1.66  0.05  -0.02  0.59  39 
Developing countries  0.12  1.09  -0.003  0.26  0.11  91 
(-1.53)  (3.06)  (1.60)  (-0.21) 
(0.31)  (1.65)  (-0.07)  (3.08) 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
Table 10A.7  OLS Estimation of Export Variation Equation I11 
Coefficients 
- 
Intercept  AGDP  EX92  AFDI  R2  N 
Textiles and clothing  0.94 
(2.57) 
Shoes and leather  0.19 
(0.30) 
Mechanical equipment  0.82 
(1.70) 
Labor-intensive  0.66 
industries  (1.79) 
industries  (-0.57) 
Capital-intensive  -0.19 
0.07  -0.10 
-0.28  -0.04 
(0.10)  (-2.25) 
(-0.21)  (-0.50) 
1.31  -0.09 
(1.97)  (-1.63) 
0.46  -0.08 
(0.62)  (- 1.82) 
1.16  0.02 
(2.20)  (0.46) 
0.23  0.26  22 
(2.54) 
0.94  0.33  14 
(2.57) 
0.17  0.27  30 
(2.60) 
0.35  0.21  36 
(2.96) 
0.21  0.19  57 
(3.33) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 312  Seungjin Kim 
Table 10A.8  OLS Estimation of Export Variation Equation IV 
Coefficients 
~ 

































0.86  0.66  7 
(3.12) 
0.27  0.24  29 
(2.74) 
-0.03  0.23  22 
(-0.34) 
0.27  0.28  35 
(3.37) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
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Comment  Mariko Sakakibara 
Kim poses two major research questions: What role did Korean OFDI 
play in the country’s economic performance? What are the characteristics 
of Korean OFDI? Performance is measured in this paper by exports and 
domestic investment. The author is especially  concerned about the possibil- 
ity that OFDI might decrease exports. These are important research issues. 
Kim concludes that “we could not find any evidence that OFDI by Ko- 
rean multinational firms had a detrimental effect on home country perfor- 
mance.” He finds no evidence that Korean OFDI substituted for exports. 
Nor does he find any evidence that OFDI decreased domestic investment. 
I  am sympathetic to this author, who  made great efforts given limited 
data availability. 
I would like, however, to raise some issues. The first issue concerns the 
data. Kim uses FDI data collected by the Bank of Korea (Korea’s central 
bank). OFDI reporting to the Bank of  Korea is mandatory for invest- 
ments that exceed approximately $1 0 million, though this cutoff changes 
over time. Once OFDI is reported, companies have an obligation to report 
the profitability of their investments. There is a strong incentive, therefore, 
for Korean firms to avoid reporting OFDI. In fact, many investments are 
made in groups of amounts below the cutoff at one time. The most pessi- 
mistic estimation suggests that half of all Korean OFDI might not be cov- 
ered by  these data.’ This sample is likely to have a bias toward large com- 
panies, namely, chaebols, or Korean conglomerates. The paper even states 
that five chaebols account for 60 percent of Korea’s OFDI stock, indicat- 
ing the possibility of sample selection bias. 
The basic setup is 
EX,  =  f(GDP,, GDPC,, OFDI,,,  EC,), 
where i represents an industry and j  represents a host country. The sign 
on EC is expected to be negative because it is assumed here that Korean 
firms are motivated to conduct tariff-jumping OFDI. This is a crude as- 
sumption because the effects of tariff jumping should be industry specific. 
Kim worries about the possibility of omitted variables, so he runs 
AEX,,  =  f(AGDP,, EX92, AOFDI,,). 
Mariko Sakakibara is assistant professor at the Anderson Graduate School of Manage- 
ment of the University of California, Los Angeles. 
The author is grateful to Dong-Sung Cho at Seoul National University for helpful com- 
ments on this article. 
1. E.g., though the official record shows that there were approximately 750 cases of OFDI 
by  Korean firms in the Quingtau area of China as of the end of 1995, keen observers in the 
Chinese market estimate that there were at least 2,000 investment cases by  Korean firms in 
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He finds the coefficients on OFDI and AOFDI to be positive and statisti- 
cally significant. 
The problem here is that taking the first difference does not solve an 
omitted-variables problem, nor does the inclusion of exports in 1992. It is 
possible that an omitted variable drives both OFDI and exports by  Ko- 
rean  firms simultaneously.2 Given the limited coverage of the data, the 
prime  candidate for an omitted variable is an indicator of  a  chaebol’s 
growth maximization orientation. Some evidence supports this possibility. 
For example, favorable bank loans are given to large firms for domestic 
and foreign investment, and for export financing. This is because of the 
very limited disclosure requirements imposed on Korea firms, which re- 
sults in profitability data not being available for lenders. The primary crite- 
rion for banks in their loan approval is the size of the borrower’s revenue. 
In addition, chaebol leaders seek social recognition from overseeing the 
largest conglomerates. The rivalry between the chairmen of Samsung and 
Hyundai is well documented. Both of these examples suggest growth max- 
imization not profit maximization by  chaebols. 
A possible scenario here is that when chaebols’ profits, cash flow,  or 
borrowing capacity increases, we  would observe increases in both exports 
and OFDI. This scenario also fits with Knickerbocker’s (1973) oligopolis- 
tic reaction in FDI. A chaebol is likely to seek all investment opportunities, 
domestic or overseas, to maximize its size. In addition, we should note the 
high domestic exit costs. Up until the 1997 Korean economic crisis, firing 
by  Korean firms was illegal. Korean firms could not fire workers unless 
they declared bankruptcy. The only way a Korean firm could fire a worker 
was to sign an “honorable retirement” contract and make severance pay- 
ments  equal  to the  sum  of  the employee’s three-year  salary  plus  one 
month’s salary times the number of years served. This prohibitively high 
exit cost suggests the possibility that firms could not decrease domestic 
production even if they increased OFDI. As a result, an increase in both 
exports and OFDI can be  observed.  If  any of  the variables suggested 
above are not  available, domestic  sales as a  proxy  for those variables 
should be used as a control, as suggested by Lipsey and Weiss (1984). 
The major contribution of this paper is to identify the characteristics of 
Korean OFDI. Given the data, OFDI is driven by  chaebols, concentrated 
in China, the ASEAN countries, and to some extent the United States, 
and focused on mechanical equipment (perhaps consumer electronics and 
semiconductors) and textiles and clothing. This kind of OFDI tends to be 
2. Though  Kim claims that this specification is to be  used to examine how exports to 
countryj are affected by OFDI to country j,  the omitted-variables bias remains if countryj 
is a favorable (or unfavorable) destination for both exports and OFDI for industry  i, which 
appears to be the case here. In addition to the possibility explained in the text, the omitted 
variables might be the ones that reflect the increasing comparative advantages of an industry, 
and policy variables of host countries are only one kind of many possible omitted variables. Effects of Outward FDI on Home Country Performance in Korea  315 
associated with the export of intermediate goods. For example, when Ko- 
rean wage levels increased, the Korean garment industry shifted its domes- 
tic garment production to China or the ASEAN countries and shipped 
Korean textiles to these countries for final sewing. 
This paper does not explain the causes of OFDI and exports by Korean 
firms, however. It is not clear whether the current structure of Korean 
OFDI and its positive association with exports will continue in the future. 
In the long run, Korean firms might relocate their production of interme- 
diate goods to China or the ASEAN countries. If the final products pro- 
duced by Korean subsidiaries are exported to third countries or to Korea, 
that will directly reduce Korean exports. As Korean firms begin to invest 
in developed countries, the current structure of FDI undertaken to seek 
cheap labor may not be sustainable. In addition, I would be concerned 
about growth maximization and overinvestment by  the chaebols. What is 
happening now is that as of the end of May 1998, $40 billion of outstand- 
ing debt is held by Korean firms, and as of the end of 1997, the average 
debt-to-equity ratio of the thirty major chaebols was 518.90 percent, far 
beyond a sustainable level. A pessimistic view might be that Korean OFDI 
has a detrimental effect on home country performance for reasons differ- 
ent from those explained in this paper. 
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Comment  Chong-Hyun Nam 
I think  Kim’s paper is interesting in two major respects. One is that it 
deals with outward foreign direct investment from a supposedly capital- 
scarce developing country, Korea; the other is that it attempts to investi- 
gate the effects of outward foreign direct investment on home country 
rather than host country performance. 
I have only a few comments about the paper. First of all, I think that 
the paper’s theme and analysis need to be more focused. As I understand 
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it, foreign direct investment in Korea, both inward and outward, has been 
quantitatively too minor  to have  any  significant impact  on macroeco- 
nomic variables. So it may not be too rewarding to explore its macroeo- 
nomic effects on such variables as domestic investment and employment 
at an aggregate level. If one wants to analyze its impact, however, I think 
the issue can best be addressed in the context of  a general equilibrium 
framework, accounting for direct as well as indirect effects. But I do think 
it is quite worthwhile and interesting to investigate the impact of foreign 
direct investment on trade at a disaggregated industrial level. 
My second comment is that the paper would gain much if it could ex- 
plain why the accumulated stock value of foreign direct investment in Ko- 
rea, both inward and outward, has been  kept  at such an exceptionally 
low level compared to not only developed countries but also developing 
countries. As  can be  seen in table  10.1, for instance, despite its recent 
surge, the stock value of  outward foreign direct investment from Korea 
for 1990-95  stands at only 2.2 percent of GDP, about one-half of that for 
developing countries on average. 
Obviously, a number of factors, both formal and informal, must have 
worked against Korea’s inward and outward foreign direct investment. I 
suspect, however, that Korea’s rather restrictive regulatory policies toward 
foreign direct investment have much to do with its poor performance in 
such investment. I think it is very important to unveil these policies and 
to discuss some of the potential economic costs borne by  Korea due to 
such policy  failures. I  should  also  point  out  that  the  relatively  small 
amounts of Korean inward and outward foreign direct investment by no 
means imply that capital flows, both inward and outward, were also small 
in Korea. In fact, Korea has relied heavily on foreign capital throughout 
its development over the past several decades; this dependence was a ma- 
jor cause of the recent financial crisis in Korea. Capital outflows have also 
grown substantially in recent years in Korea. Both capital inflows and 
outflows, however,  often took the form of loans or portfolio investment 
than of  foreign direct investment. Again, it would  be interesting to ex- 
plain why, 
Another point I want to make is that Kim’s paper presents interesting 
empirical evidence that Korea’s outward direct investment did not hamper 
but rather promoted its exports, particularly in such labor-intensive indus- 
tries as textiles and clothing and shoes and leather, contrary to the com- 
mon expectation. Kim argues that outward foreign direct investment in 
Korea might have created new exports of intermediate goods that belong 
to the same industry classifications. I wonder whether this finding holds 
true for data periods other than 1994. I also think it would be interesting 
to examine the effects of outward foreign direct investment on Korea’s 
imports as well, at a disaggregated industrial level and on a bilateral basis. 
I suspect that the motivation behind some of  Korea’s outward foreign Effects of Outward FDI on Home Country Performance in Korea  317 
direct investments is to produce parts and components or other resource- 
based intermediate goods more cheaply abroad and to ship them back to 
parent firms in Korea. 
Finally, I think it would be interesting to examine how investment mo- 
tives and environments faced by  Korean firms have been changing over 
time and how Korean firms have been responding to such changes. For 
instance, in recent years, chaebols in Korea have made bold and aggressive 
outward foreign direct investments in high-tech industries in the United 
States and elsewhere, mainly for the purpose of acquiring advanced tech- 
nologies and increasing access to larger overseas markets. According to 
Kim’s paper, the five largest chaebols made up more than 60 percent of 
Korea’s total outward foreign direct investment in 1995 alone, and more 
than 80 percent of this outward foreign direct investment was financed by 
foreign resources. I wonder whether these outward foreign direct invest- 
ments have served their intended objectives and whether they have been 
cost-effective. 